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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: SENTENCING




Advances in basic and clinical neuroscience will soon present novel
options for prediction, treatment, and prevention of antisocial behavior,
particularly drug addiction. These hard-won advances have significant
potential to improve public health and safety and increase efficiency in
delivery of treatment and rehabilitation. Moreover, such therapies will
undoubtedly find a large portion of their target population in the criminal
justice system as long as drug possession remains criminalized.
Improvements, however, are not without risks. The risks stem not only
from the safety and side-effect profile of such treatments, but also from
their insertion into a criminal justice and sentencing system that may be
overburdened, overpoliticized, undertheorized, and lacking sufficient
checks and balances on institutional competency and legitimacy.
Furthermore, as neurological and biological therapies become more
targeted and effective, they may threaten to override multi-faceted
rehabilitation measures designed to address the social, cultural, economic,
and psychological aspects of drug use and involvement with the criminal
justice system. While offering substantial therapeutic benefits, such
advances might also short-circuit a critical policy discussion about the
nature of drug use and its criminalization.
New neuroscience treatments for addiction and antisocial behavior
should force a deep examination of the legal, social, political, and ethical
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roots of drug and problem-solving courts, and particularly the mixed
criminal justice/public health model on which they rest. As technologies to
control behavior become more direct, targeted, and powerful, so do the
risks of their misuse and potential harms to constitutional rights, individual
autonomy, institutional competency, and institutional legitimacy.
INTRODUCTION
California has a not-so-distant history of therapeutic interference in the
brains of criminal offenders. UCLA hosted the "Violence Project" in the
early 1970's, and there are reports of experimental psychosurgery in the
Vacaville state correctional facility in the same time period.' These
programs were designed to take advantage of cutting-edge understanding in
psychology and neuroscience to fix a politically problematic crisis in rising
crime rates. Such efforts were reportedly abandoned after political
backlash against abusive research and treatment practices. 2 This historical
context, coupled with present-day procedures that may give an undue sense
of sophistication, should make the criminal justice system particularly
cautious about adopting new and potentially invasive neuroscience
technologies even if guided by the legitimate and compassionate goals of
treating public health problems and promoting public safety.
Advances in basic and clinical neuroscience will soon present novel
options for prediction, treatment, and prevention of antisocial behavior,
particularly drug addiction. These hard-won advances have significant
potential to improve public health and safety and increase efficiency in
delivery of treatment and rehabilitation. Moreover, such therapies will
undoubtedly find a large portion of their target population in the criminal
justice system as long as drug possession remains criminalized.
Improvements, however, are not without risks. The risks stem not only
from the safety and side-effect profile of such treatments, but also from
their insertion into a criminal justice and sentencing system that may be
overburdened, overpoliticized, undertheorized, and lacking sufficient
checks and balances that provide institutional competency and legitimacy.
1. "In his 1973 State of the State message, California governor Ronald Reagan
announced plans for the establishment of a biomedical facility, the Center for the Study of
the Reduction of Violence. Supported by state and federal funds, the first center was
planned for the psychiatry department at UCLA, headed by Louis Jolyn 'Jolly' West."
Allen L. Barker, Leonard Kille and Documented Brain Implant Victims,
http://www.bio.net/bionet/mm/neur-scil2004-August/058980.html (Aug. 29, 2004 11:31
AM). Rudimentary information on psychosurgery experiments at Vacaville was published
in the Napa Sentinel in 1991. Harry V. Martin & David Caul, Mind Control, SONIC.NET,
http://dmc.members.sonic.net/sentinel/gvcon8.html (last visited Jul. 24, 2012).
2. Id.
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Furthermore, as neurological and biological therapies become more
targeted and effective, they may threaten to override multi-faceted
rehabilitation measures designed to address the social, cultural, economic,
and psychological aspects of drug use and involvement with the criminal
justice system. Critically, effective therapies for addiction may obscure a
more complex social and political problem: highly effective treatments
delivered through the criminal justice system might short-circuit a critical
policy discussion about the nature of drug use and its criminalization.
For these reasons, new neuroscience treatments for addiction and
antisocial behavior should provoke a deep examination of the legal, social,
political, and ethical roots of drug and problem-solving courts, and
particularly the mixed criminal justice/public health model they rest on.
As technologies to control behavior become more direct, targeted, and
powerful, so do the risks of their misuse and potential harms to
constitutional rights, individual autonomy, and ultimately institutional
competency and legitimacy.
The goal of this paper is to present the anticipated therapeutic options
from neuroscience and outline critical issues with respect to their potential
integration into criminal justice and sentencing law and policy. Part I
introduces forthcoming neuroscience technologies related to antisocial
behavior prediction, treatment, and prevention, with an emphasis on
therapies to treat drug addiction. Part II assumes that drug courts will be
the entry point of these therapies into the criminal justice system. Thus,
Part II outlines the components of a cost-benefit analysis of integrating
such therapies and considers the implications for currently used
intermediate sanctions and diversionary programs providing drug
treatment. Part III then argues that beyond such a cost-benefit or
evidence-based policy analysis, the unique characteristics of novel
treatments and therapies from neuroscience squarely raise fundamental
questions about the nature of coerced treatment at the heart of drug courts
and the policy and jurisprudential justifications thereof. The
brain-invasive nature of certain novel therapies provokes discussion of the
proper institutional role and competencies of a drug court and its
participants. Critiques of this central issue have been raised before: the
setting-aside of the traditional adversarial model for a therapeutic
team-based model leveraged by the criminal justice system. Despite
criticism, drug courts have proliferated.3 The opportunity to directly
3. Approximately 2,400 drug courts serve about 117,000 drug offenders throughout
each of the fifty states in the United States today. See WEST HUDDLESTON, III & DOUGLAS E.
MARLOWE, NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL
REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES (July 2011), available at http://www.ndci.org/publications/painting-current-picture.
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manipulate a person's brain should reignite debate about the proper
composition, procedures, and theory behind drug courts, and ultimately
more fundamental questions about drug criminalization policy. Similar
critiques have been offered from philosophical and socio-political
perspectives.4 This article complements those critiques and postulates that
they may gain traction among policy makers and drug court overseers when
confronted with novel risks posed by treatments from neuroscience. I
conclude with the idea that "beneficence is not enough" when mixing
medicine and the threat or consequence of criminal punishment, and that
the availability of good tools to implement good intentions for good
outcomes should not override important fundamental legal principles such
as due process and separation of powers that function to preserve individual
rights and autonomy.
I. ANTICIPATED NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES WITH POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Neuroscience research proceeds with two goals: the first is to
understand, and therefore to predict; and the second is to manipulate, treat,
or intervene for the benefit of the human subject. The scientific overview
that follows focuses on research and development that may have an impact
on understanding and treating "antisocial behavior," roughly characterized
as behavior that violates the criminal law or behavior that often
substantially interferes with normal life pursuits, such as serious substance
addiction.' This overview does not attempt to engage with any single
criminological theory of what causes antisocial behavior, and in particular,
does not advocate for a bio-criminologic theory of the antecedents of
criminal or antisocial behavior.6 This overview also does not take a
4. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 417 (2009); Douglas Husak, Retributivism, Proportionality, and the Challenge of the
Drug Court Movement, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: HAS IT A FuTuRE? (Michael Tonry
ed., 2012).
5. See Gerald R. Patterson, Barbra DeBaryshe & Elizabeth Ramsey, Or. Soc. Learning
Ctr., A Developmental Perspective on Antisocial Behavior, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329, 329
(1989).
6. See, e.g., Peter Monaghan, Biocriminology, 55 CHRoN. HIGHER EDUC., no. 32, Apr.
17, 2009 at B4, B4-B5 (describing the re-emergence of a subfield of criminology due to
expansion of understanding of the biological bases of human behavior: "By taking into
account that human beings are not just social and cultural creatures but biological ones,
too - in fact, biologically inclined to be social and cultural - criminologists will learn
more about the sources of crime, ... and that should lead to better policy.").
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position on competing philosophical or political theories of addiction.' Nor
does this overview mean to suggest that such understanding and therapies
from neuroscience should be the sole or even primary avenue of research or
development when it comes to the modification of antisocial or
self-destructive behavior. Rather, this section attempts a realistic but
optimistic look at what is coming down the scientific pipeline, so that such
advances can be put into an appropriate normative and policy context with
respect to their societal impact. While the remainder of this paper focuses
on addiction and drug courts, the neuroscience reviewed here is broader in
scope. Addiction and drug courts are but one hook for the entire scope of
research reviewed here. Behavior manipulation technologies may take
many forms and enter the criminal justice or public health system in ways
not yet anticipated. The spadework presented in Parts II and III with
respect to drug courts is done as an exemplar for how neuroscience may
meet law in a practical, low-level, administrative, relatively routine, and
ultimately structural context. Other examples abound, but are beyond the
scope of this paper. Behavior prediction, in particular, may have an outsize
impact well exceeding the predictable drama of trial evidence. This section
will briefly highlight ongoing research that relates to neuroscience-based
antisocial behavior prediction before moving on to therapies targeted
towards drug addiction.
A. Prediction ofBehavior and Treatment Response
The criminal justice system, and subsidiary drug and problem-solving
courts, would undoubtedly benefit from the ability to predict future
behavior and accurately anticipate the effects of intervention. Such
prescience would assist policymakers and the criminal justice system in
efficiently allocating resources for desired outcomes. For example, a judge
may have increased confidence in deciding who to incarcerate because of
future dangerousness versus who to send to a community corrections
program. Drug court screening processes, discussed in Part II infra, would
certainly be impacted.
Correctional institutions in several jurisdictions now commonly deploy
actuarial tools for risk assessment based on empirical research.8 These
7. See Douglas Husak & Emily Murphy, The Relevance of the Neuroscience of
Addiction to the Criminal Law, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
(forthcoming 2013).
8. Examples of actuarial risk-assessment screening tools in use by criminal justice
departments include the Level of Service Inventory Revised: Screening Version, see Don
Andrews & James Bonta, Psychological Assessments and Services, Level of Service
Inventory Revised, MULTI-HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.,
http://www.mhs.com/product.aspx?gr-saf&prod=lsi-rs&id=overview (last visited Aug. 5,
2013] 87
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tools make predictions based on observable characteristics such as
demographics, criminal history, and behavioral features. Research into the
neural basis of psychopathy,9 addiction, and other antisocial behavior may
further focus and refine such actuarial prediction tools by adding
information about an individual's neural mechanisms.o
Three decision-making strategies may make different predictive use of
neuroscience information. The first is diagnosing offenders into categories
with known elevated risks of recidivism, such as psychopaths. The second
is identifying certain offenders within a particular class who are more
dangerous than others. The third is using measures such as brain scans and
genetic profiles to predict which among several treatment options might
work for a particular individual." For a drug court seeking to pair clients
2012);, the California Static Risk Assessment, see Susan Turner & Jesse Jannetta, California
Static Risk Assessment, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, (Apr. 2, 2009),
http://nicic.gov/Library/023641; and the newer Classification of Violence Risk, John
Monahan et al., PAR, INC., Classification of Violence Risk, http://www4.parinc.com/
Products/Product.aspx?ProductlD=COVR (last visited Aug. 14, 2012).
9. See Greg Miller, Investigating the Psychopathic Mind, 321 Sci. 1284, 1284 (2008).
Psychopathy is a serious personality disorder that has long been of interest in criminological
research. Id. More recently, it has become the focus of neuroscience research, with the goal
of using neuroimaging and genetics to understand the underlying neurobiological basis of
the suite of emotional and interpersonal characteristics that make up the profile. Id. at 1285.
Psychopaths exhibit an extreme lack of empathy, glibness, high levels of risk taking,
pathological lying, grandiosity, and highly antisocial behavior, while being very cunning
and manipulative of others. Id. They make up an estimated 1% of the general population,
but an estimated 25-40% of the incarcerated population. Id. Psychopaths have been shown
to have incredibly high rates of recidivism, which strongly correlates with the extremeness
of the cluster of psychopathy symptoms. Id. Current assessment via the interview-based
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) is often part of parole assessment. Research in
incarcerated populations in New Mexico by Kent Kiehl and colleagues is attempting to
discover the neural basis of psychopathy by obtaining structural and functional brain scans
from volunteer inmates. Id. at 1284. One of several goals of this data collection is to see
whether specific neural signatures might be associated with psychopathy, and if, in turn,
such biological measures might be used to refine or speed up the diagnostic process or to
enable novel therapies. Id. at 1286.
10. A recent example of how neural signal information from a brain scan can improve
predictions beyond those derived from self-report measures was reported by Emily B. Falk
et al., Predicting Persuasion-Induced Behavior Change from the Brain, 30 J. NEUROSCI.
8421, 8421 (2010). Neural responses to persuasive messages to use sunscreen were found
to improve predictions of actual behavior within the following week, beyond predictions
made based on what subjects reported to be their intentions and attitudes towards sunscreen
use after exposure to the messages. Id. at 8423-24. Even more recently, Eyal Aharoni and
colleagues reported that brain activity in a particular region-closely associated with
impulsivity-predicted felony rearrests after offender release. Eyal Aharoni et al.,
Neuroprediction ofFuture Rearrest, PROC. NAT'L ACADEMY Sci. 6223 (2013).
11. Efforts at predicting treatment response span from pharmacogenetic and epigenetic
research to brain scanning. At present, there have been more disappointments than success.
However, one model for this type of work is the genetics of serotonin transporter alleles.
See, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a
[Vol. 3788
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with effective treatment and minimize relapse and recidivism, the third
method may be of significant utility if it leads to a cost-effective refinement
of diagnostic procedures. To incorporate such information, however, a
decision maker must understand that brain scanning or genetic profiling
alone will not provide enough information to support decisions about a
person's future behavior or treatment outcomes. 12 There is almost certainly
no simple biomarker that by itself is highly predictive of future behavior.' 3
Complex behavior is mediated through constantly communicating neural
circuits and interaction with dynamic physical and social environment.
Moreover, the application of prediction research to individuals in a criminal
justice context will be hindered by the reality of substantial individual
differences that are deliberately obscured in group-based studies. 14 Brain
scanning or genetic profiling should thus be only a component of a risk
assessment prediction and is extremely unlikely to be dispositive on its
own. Whether it is cost-effective in terms of the additional predictive
validity it provides at an individual level remains an open empirical
Polymorphism in the 5-HTT Gene, 301 Sci. 386, 386 (2003); Kenneth S. Kendler et al., The
Interaction of Stressful Life Events and a Serotonin Transporter Polymorphism in the
Prediction of Episodes of Major Depression: a Replication, 62 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
529, 529 (2005); Murray B. Stein et al., Serotonin Transporter Gene Promoter
Polymorphism Predicts SSRI Response in Generalized Social Anxiety Disorder, 187
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 68, 68 (2006). Having two short alleles is associated with
enhanced vulnerability to depression after traumatic life event triggers and reduced
responsiveness to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) therapy for emotional and
anxiety disorders. Id. One short and one long allele seem to convey some resilience and
better responsiveness to SSRI therapy and two long alleles conveys even greater resilience
and responsiveness to SSRI therapy. Id. Of course, these are population averages, but this
type of work may have practical utility in predicting the type of pharmacological therapy
that should be deployed in a particular person, rather than a trial-and-error approach so often
attempted in the clinic.
12. See, e.g., Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in
the Human Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCI. 543, 543 (2008). One set of advancements,
however, may help refine the predictive power of brain scans by looking for subtle patterns
of activation rather than gross differences in activity in a given voxel (a representation of a
cube of brain tissue, akin to a 3-D pixel). Id. This analytic technique, known generally as
multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA), uses machine learning (such as support vector
machines) to assess changes in subtle and discrete patterns of activity. This exciting
advancement is expected to underlie major strides in behavioral neuroscience research, as it
more closely reflects the incredibly complex and interconnected nature of the brain.
13. See Aharoni et al., supra note 10, at 664 ("We are skeptical that emerging
neurobiological markers could ever independently outperform these existing tools in
sensitivity and specifcity, but they could potentially improve overall risk estimates in
combination with known psychosocial risk factors.").
14. See generally Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly:
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental State, 62
STAN. L. REv. 1119, 1182 (2010) (discussing the group-to-individual inference problem in
the context of brain scanning for forensic or diagnostic purposes).
2013] 89
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question requiring an answer before any potential use within the medical
diagnostic or criminal justice contexts.
Of course, none of these technological advances do the normative work
of deciding the best course of action to take with any particular individual,
or even with particular groups of persons: diversion programs, traditional
confinement, or civil commitment. Neuroscience cannot directly help us
differentiate between such options, but it might incrementally assist in the
initial decision of who to release, monitor, or detain, or which treatment to
attempt based on empirical information about an individual's likely
response.
B. Behavioral Modification: Novel Therapeutic Options for Drug
Addiction
Treatment informed by neuroscience is anticipated to be one of the
major contributions of brain sciences to the criminal justice system,
particularly in the realm of therapies for drug and alcohol addiction.'s
Drug addiction is a chronic and relapsing disorder of compulsive drug
seeking and taking in the face of adverse consequences.16 Addiction is an
enormous public health problem, with estimates of the societal cost
exceeding $275 billion dollars per year in lost productivity, medical
expenses, and crime.17 In a 2004 survey, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimated that about 53% of state and 45% of federal prisoners met
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV),'
criteria for drug abuse or dependence.' 9 To understand how present and
novel therapies for drug addiction work, a brief overview of the current
neuroscientific understanding of drug addiction is presented below. 20
The neural correlates of addiction are characterized as a series of
staged physical changes corresponding to the psychological/behavioral
aspects of addiction: binging/intoxication, withdrawal, and preoccupation
15. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but
Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 1103, 1104 (2008).
16. George F. Koob & Nora D. Volkow, Neurocircuitry of Addiction, 35
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 217, 217 (2010) (citation omitted).
17. SCHNEIDER INST. FOR POL'Y AT BRANDEIS UNIv., SUBSTANCE ABUSE: THE NATION'S
NUMBER ONE HEALTH PROBLEM 18 (J.J. Stein ed., 2001).
18. See Am. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).
19. Christopher J. Mumola & Jennifer C. Karberg, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213530,
DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004, at I (rev. ed. 2007)
(2006).
20. A slightly more robust overview can be found in Husak & Murphy, supra note 6.
90 [Vol. 37
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or craving.21 Distinct neural systems have been found to mediate each of
these stages and are modified with long-term drug use such that the neural
and behavioral changes occur together in a negative feedback loop as drug
use escalates and persists.22 One major change pathway is as follows: in
the early stages of drug-taking, elevated levels of the neurotransmitter
dopamine (a consequence of intoxication) in the mesolimbic neural
pathway convey an enhanced salience signal, which serves to modify
neural connections and reinforce conditioned effects of drug-taking such as
rewarding association of the drug with environmental context and
particular cues (including particular people, objects, or sensations and
perceptions).23 In essence, initial drug exposures create the first neural
impressions of a powerful memory related to a rewarding experience.24
Drug-induced enhancement of conditioned-reinforcing effects interacts
with executive cognitive functions that integrate sensory, emotional,
contextual, and cue-responsive inputs to modify behavioral output. 25 As
drug taking persists, this interaction is thought to shift from a neural system
that selects among goal-based action plans to one primarily driven by
persistent, stimulus-driven, goal-insensitive habits, and eventually to one
driven by powerful compulsions to seek and take yet more drugs, which is
the hallmark of drug addiction.26
Drug abuse and addiction can be described as parallel (and intimately
related) tracks of changes in brain plasticity-how cells in the brain are
wired together to communicate-and changes in an individual's
psychology and behavior. For example, long-term drug taking modifies
the availability of neurotransmitter receptors in brain cell membranes,
which alters neuronal connections and thus disrupts normal brain
functions. 27  Long-term changes in receptor availability and neural
connectivity are thought to be major components of the escalation and
maintenance of drug use, as well as the development and persistence of
21. Koob & Volkow, supra note 16.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Barry J. Everitt & Trevor W. Robbins, Neural Systems of Reinforcement for
Drug Addiction: From Actions to Habits to Compulsion, 8 NATURE NEUROSCI. 1481, 1483
(2005); see generally Julie A. Kauer & Robert C. Malenka, Synaptic Plasticity and
Addiction, 8 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 844 (2007) (citation omitted).
25. Id.; see STEVEN HYMAN, ROBERT MALENKA & ERIC NESTLER, MOLECULAR
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY: A FOUNDATION FOR CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE (Anne Sydor &
Regina Y. Brown eds.. 2d ed. 2008).
26. See Everitt & Robbins, supra note 24; Peter W. Kalivas & Charles O'Brien, Drug
Addiction as a Pathology of Staged Neuroplasticity, 33 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 166
(2008).
27. Koob & Volkow, supra note 16.
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28
addictive behaviors and the difficulty of treatment and relapse prevention.
These "neuroadaptive" changes are thought to be sequential and
cumulative, beginning with firing pattern alterations in the mesolimbic
dopamine system after even limited drug exposure, as described above.29
These changes seem to trigger the next set of neural plasticity changes in
the ventral striatal area, where altered neurotransmission induced by drug
exposure creates a feedback loop in the basic circuit that subserves learning
by categorizing a particular experience as highly salient, which has impacts
on attention, motivation, and learning. 30 As drug taking persists, the next
phase of neural alterations engages the dorsal striatum, which subserves
habit (stimulus-response) learning and habit execution. 3 1 Human imaging
studies have shown that, at this point, merely displaying drug-associated
stimuli can increase dopamine in the dorsal striatal areas of addicted
subjects, an effect that correlates with self-reported measures of craving. 32
Cortical areas involved in motivation and control of impulsive and
compulsive behavior, which feed back to affect dopamine release in
response to conditioned cues, are also recruited by the synaptic plasticity
changes triggered by drug use, exacerbating the usurpation of the learning,
motivational, and attentional systems that normally control behavior.3 3 The
frontal cortex (which controls integration of information from other brain
systems leading to planning, value-based decision-making, insight and
behavioral control) and its projections to systems subserving emotional and
memory functions are also disrupted in addiction.34 The complete effect of
drug addiction on the brain is usurpation of the neural bases of the
cognitive and emotional systems that regulate behavioral control.35
Overall, the best single-word description of the neural and psychological
changes in drug addiction is a "hijacking" of the brain's normal learning,
behavioral planning, and control systems.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See generally Nora D. Volkow, J.S. Fowler, Gene-Jack Wang & J.M. Swanson,
Dopamine in Drug Abuse and Addiction: Results from Imaging Studies and Treatment
Implications, 9 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 557 (2004).
31. Id. at 561-62.
32. Nora D. Volkow et al., Dopamine Increases in Striatum do not Elicit Craving in
Cocaine Abusers Unless they are Coupled with Cocaine Cues, 39 NEUROIMAGE 1266, 1266
(2008).
33. See Koob & Volkow, supra note 16.
34. Rita Z. Goldstein & Nora D. Volkow, Drug Addiction and its Underlying
Neurobiological Basis: Neuroimaging Evidence for the Involvement of the Frontal Cortex,
159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1642, 1642-52 (2002).
35. Id.
92 [Vol. 37
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1. Treating Drugs with Drugs: Current Antagonism and
Substitution Therapies
Given that long-term drug taking has such widespread and powerful
effects on brain plasticity, research into treatments for addiction is looking
beyond currently available pharmacological therapies.3 6  At present,
pharmacological treatment for addiction generally takes one of two forms:
substitution or antagonism therapies.3 7 Within these two major categories,
there is a limited armamentarium of FDA-approved drugs, some of which
are presently used in treatment programs such as those linked to drug
courts." As with all prescription drugs, these therapies must be prescribed
by a licensed physician, and are further regulated by federal statutes
governing the use of "scheduled" prescription drugs with abuse potential.39
These therapies, which are already in use and relatively familiar to the
medico-legal community, will be briefly described to serve as a point of
comparison with anticipated therapies.
In pharmacological substitution therapies, the drug of abuse is
effectively replaced by a copycat of the substance that acts at the same
receptors, to a lesser degree and sometimes via an alternative route of
administration, with the goal of reducing cravings for and symptoms of
withdrawal from the illicit or abused substance. Substitution therapies are
FDA approved for opiate (i.e. heroin or prescription painkiller) and alcohol
addiction, with some off-label benefits also reported for polydrug users
who additionally abuse stimulants, such as cocaine.40 Currently available
substitution treatments for opiate addiction are methadone and
buprenorphine, both of which act as agonists at the opioid receptors in the
brain: inducing feelings of comfort short of euphoria, and preventing
craving and withdrawal symptoms. 4 1 These therapies are used in a regimen
of detoxification, stabilization, and long-term maintenance of an addict's
36. Nora D. Volkow & Phil Skolnick, New Medications for Substance Abuse Disorders:
Challenges and Opportunities, 37 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY REVIEws 290, 291 (2012).
37. See, e.g., Bisaga & Popik, In Search of a New Pharmacological Treatment for Drug
and Alcohol Addiction: N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) antagonists, 59 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 1, 1-2 (2000).
38. See DONALD F. ANSPACH & ANDREW S. FERGUSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
202901, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF TREATMENT MODALITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ADULT
DRUG COURTS, FINAL REPORT (2003), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/202901.pdf.
39. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (Oct. 27, 1970)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801).
40. See 42 C.F.R. § 8.12 (h)(2)(i) (2011).
41. See id.
932013]
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physical symptoms of drug addiction.42 Methadone, a schedule II drug,
must be administered daily in a regulated clinic, 4 3 putting resource
constraints on meeting a population need in both crowded urban and
underserved rural settings. Buprenorphine is an opioid partial agonist,
approved by the FDA in 2002 and available in oral dosing formulations
that, in combination with the long-acting pharmacokinetics, allow a
treatment-compliant patient to self-dose at home every two or three days
rather than going to a clinic every day. 4 Buprenorphine, particularly in
combination with naltrexone, an opiate antagonist, has also shown some
beneficial effects in polydrug addiction, particularly cocaine and alcohol
addiction in addition to opiate dependence. 45 The mechanisms behind the
full range of buprenorphine's effects are not fully understood, though
hypothesized to be related to the complexities of its effects at different
46
subtypes of endogenous opiate receptors.
Antagonism therapies, instead of mimicking the drug of abuse at the
brain's receptors, act to physically block a drug's access to a receptor or to
provoke adverse effects if the abused drug is ingested.47 One example of
this type of drug therapy that has received interest from the medico-legal
community for its use in criminal justice populations is naltrexone.48
Naltrexone is a synthetic opioid that blocks receptors and prevents others
42. James J. Manlandro, Jr., Using Buprenorphine for Outpatient Opioid Detoxification,
107 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC Ass'N, No. 9 ES 11, ES12 (Supp. 5 2007).
43. Id.atESll.
44. The Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, Div. B., Title
XXXV § 3502, and its 2006 amendment, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-469 § 1101, 120 Stat. 3502 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 823), amended the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 U.S.C.), to enable physicians,
rather than federally regulated clinics, to offer Schedule m, IV, or V opioid medications
(such as buprenorphine and its combination with another opioid antagonist, naloxone) to
treat opioid addiction. See id. at ESll . This federal regulation permitting office-based
treatment with scheduled drugs was intended to increase access to addiction therapies. See
id.
45. D.J. McCann, Potential of Buprenorphine/Naltrexone in Treating Polydrug
Addiction and Co-Occurring Psychiatric Disorders, 83 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 627, 627 (2008).
46. Id.
47. An aversive therapy for alcohol abuse was accidentally discovered when workers in
a plant exposed to disulfiram vapors became violently ill upon ingesting alcohol.
Disulfiram, which interferes with the metabolism of alcohol and provokes nausea, vomiting,
and other extremely unpleasant reactions, is marketed for the treatment of alcohol addiction
as Antabuse. See Helge Kragh, From Disulfiram to Antabuse: The Invention of a Drug, 33
BULL. HiST. CHEMISTRY 82, 83 (2008).
48. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Judicially Mandated Treatment with Naltrexone for
Opiate-Addicted Criminal Offenders, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 64, 64 (2005).
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from binding, 49 preventing a user from feeling the effects of ingested heroin
or prescription painkillers and producing no subjective side effects on its
own. The rationale behind its use is that a person on naltrexone will learn
that opiate ingestion is pointless because they feel no effects from it, and
thus curtail their use.50  Persons receiving naltrexone must be fully
detoxified from opiates before treatment can be started to avoid
precipitating a dangerous withdrawal syndrome.51
In a rare study involving the criminal justice population, volunteer
federal probationers or parolees with a history of opioid addiction
participated in a naltrexone treatment experiment. 52 Among the subjects
that completed the study, opioid use and rearrest rates were significantly
lower in the group of subjects receiving oral naltrexone in addition to
counseling during a six month period than in those receiving only
counseling and monitoring. 5 3  In 2006, a long-lasting injectable form of
naltrexone became available, and in a randomized, placebo-controlled
study of volunteer opioid-dependent subjects it was found to extend
retention time in an eight-week treatment program (when given at the
beginning of the first and fifth weeks), but was without significant
dose-responsive effects on the percentage of opioid-positive urine
samples. 54  Nevertheless, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
49. Id. at 67.
50. Id. at 68.
51. See id. at 67.
52. Federal regulations tightly control human subjects research with incarcerated
populations because of ethical concerns about coercion and lack of autonomy or fully
informed consent. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2012). While an important protection for
prisoners following a sordid history of medical research abuses, this regulation (known as
the "Common Rule") has the effect of substantially limiting biomedical research in prison,
probationer, and parolee populations. While certain biological aspects of drug addiction
therapy, such as the pharmacokinetics and side effect profiles, can be assessed in the general
population with relative confidence about the generalizability of the results, behavioral and
psychosocial aspects of such therapies may be distinct within criminal justice populations.
Consequently, little is known about whether certain therapy effects would be similar or have
significant differences if offered or mandated to a criminal justice population.
53. Subjects receiving naltrexone averaged 8% of positive opioid urine specimens, while
control subjects averaged 30% positive. Twenty-six percent of subjects receiving
naltrexone were re-incarcerated for probation violations, compared to 56% of control
subjects. However, cocaine use among both groups was "high," and the study is
confounded by the volunteer nature which may insert a bias for those willing and motivated
to participate in drug treatment. Retention rates were 52% for the naltrexone group (n=37
completing the study) and 33% for the control group (n=17 completing the study). James
W. Cornish et al., Naltrexone Pharmacotherapy for Opioid Dependent Federal
Probationers, 14 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 529, 532-33 (1997).
54. Sandra D. Comer et al., Injectable, Sustained-Release Naltrexone for the Treatment
of Opioid Dependence, 63 ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 210, 212 (2006) (finding no
significant dose-related effects when results were recalculated without assumption that
missing samples and participants would test positive); see also Sarah Teagle, NAT'L INST. OF
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funded a five-site study of recently released parolees with a history of
opioid addiction to be treated with either extended-release naltrexone or
treatment as usual for six months.55 Sixty-one opioid-dependent
volunteers-all of whom were under legal supervision as a parolee,
probationer, or in a diversionary program-received a series of monthly
injections with extended-release naltrexone and then were followed for a
six-month period.56 Promisingly, those who completed the series of
injections were more likely to complete the six-month follow up, had
significantly fewer opioid-positive urines, and were less likely to have been
incarcerated than those who had not completed treatment.57 Despite the
study's limitations, researchers concluded that extended-release naltrexone
may be a "feasible and effective treatment option" for persons under legal
supervision.
In terms of treatment strategies, pharmacological therapies using
substitution or antagonism strategies are akin to symptom control rather
than curative measures. Persons taking substitution therapies generally do
so for long periods of time (the "maintenance" phase), with gradual
withdrawal attempted only under the guidance of a physician and treatment
often resumed if the withdrawal consequences are intolerable and the
patient can continue to afford the maintenance therapy. Antagonism
strategies work only as long as the therapeutic drugs are present in a
person's bloodstream and cerebrospinal fluid, and are basically an indirect
route to behavioral modification by temporarily making the drug-taking
experience ineffective or unpleasant and helping a motivated user break the
cycle of drug seeking and taking. As legal scholar Richard Bonnie
emphasizes, "naltrexone does not produce any lasting change in the
patient's brain or personality"-a feature used to distinguish it from other
court-mandated medical interventions such as chemical castration for sex
offenders and anti-psychotic medication for the severely mentally ill. 59
DRUG ABUSE, Depot Naltrexone Appears Safe and Effective for Heroin Addiction, 21 NIDA
NOTES 7, 7 (2007), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/nnvol2ln3.pdf
(finding injectable form of naltrexone "performed well" in this pilot clinical study).
55. See Richard J. Bonnie, Donna T. Chen & Charles. P. O'Brien, The Impact ofModern
Neuroscience on Treatment of Parolees: Ethical Considerations in Using Pharmacology to
Prevent Addiction Relapse, THE DANA FoUND. (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.dana.org/news/cerebrum/detail.aspx?id=13932; Donna M. Coviello et al., A
Multisite Pilot Study of Extended-Release Injectable Naltrexone Treatment for Previously
Opioid-Dependent Parolees and Probationers, 33 SUBSTANCE ABUSE 48 (2012).
56. Donna Coviello et al., supra note 55, at 53.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id.
59. Bonnie, supra note 48, at 71.
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Whether or not the brain-invasive nature of a treatment is critical for a legal
and ethical analysis will be discussed in Part III.
Novel treatments coming from neuroscience research are
fundamentally different from these currently-available strategies in one or
more crucial respects: the duration of time they may last without an active
drug in someone's system in the case of vaccines, and the attempted direct
modification of the neural pathways of learning and memory hijacked by
drugs of abuse and thought to be the fundamental problem precipitating
relapse episodes, including those that occur even years after detoxification
and abstinence. These therapies may be more efficacious and
cost-effective, but are also more invasive of a person's biology and
autonomy than drugs that may be discontinued at will. These heightened
levels of effectiveness and invasiveness are what should trigger renewed
scrutiny of the legal and administrative mechanisms by which such drugs
are administered in any kind of criminal justice context, as discussed in
Part III.
2. Blocking Drug Effects: Vaccines
Vaccination against drug addiction works on a similar principle to
pharmacological antagonism therapies in that after the vaccine is
administered and antibodies have been produced, the ingestion of the drug
will have a reduced or no effect on the user. Both strategies attack or
block the drug of abuse, rather than having restorative or protective effects
on neural systems affected by the drug. In theory, the vaccinated user will
cease to take the drug as he stops experiencing its pleasant effects.6 0
Moreover, vaccines use the human immune system to block the ingested
drug from getting into the brain where it has its subjectively rewarding
effects, and as such, do not attempt to directly modify neural pathways or
even occupy neural receptors. In this sense, vaccination is less directly
invasive of a person's central nervous system than a therapy like
naltrexone, which does get into the brain and works by chronically
occupying receptors, although it does not modify the person's subjective
experience or, presumably, have much effect on brain plasticity other than
acting as a blockade to the drug of abuse. On the other hand, vaccination
may be more biologically invasive because it is designed to trigger the
production of antibodies that persist in one's bloodstream long after the
dose is administered, making it physically impossible to undo the effects
simply by stopping therapeutic dosing. Depending on the dosing schedule,
a person receiving vaccination may have fewer decision points at which to
60. Kayt Sukel, Cocaine Vaccine May Offer Alternative Therapy to Addicts, THE DANA
FOUND. (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.dana.org/news/features/detail.aspx?id=24498.
2013] 97
Law & Psychology Review
exercise his autonomy and curtail or modify treatment, because the
injection is designed to have long-lasting effects on the body's immune
system.61
Clinical trials for a cocaine vaccine in development called TA-CD have
reported mixed results and, at present, the vaccine is not approved for
clinical therapeutic use.62 The vaccine works by attaching cocaine
molecules (too small for the immune system to normally respond to) to a
large protein from the cholera bacterium. 6 3 The body's immune system
then develops antibodies to both the bacterium and the cocaine molecules,
such that after ingestion cocaine is attacked by the new antibodies and
sequestered in the bloodstream before it reaches the brain.6 Thus far, the
TA-CD vaccine has been shown to require frequent initial dosing and
"booster" shots to achieve effective levels of immunogenicity, and even
65then demonstrates highly variable rates of antibody production. A
randomized, double-blind, placebo controlled trial demonstrated that only
38% of subjects receiving the vaccination produced sufficient antibodies to
significantly reduce cocaine usage as measured by urine samples for two
months following dosing.66 Of those who developed high levels of
antibodies, 53% showed a 50% reduction in cocaine use, compared to 23%
of those who developed low antibody levels, and a quarter of subjects
failed to develop antibodies at all. 6 7 A recent study among non-treatment
seeking cocaine-addicted volunteers showed that plasma antibody levels
correlated with the reduction in the drug's subjective effects in the
immediate minutes following ingestion. 68 The 2009 research report also
indicated a potential major side effect of the vaccination strategy: "[s]ome
of the addicts participating in a study of the vaccine started doing massive
61. Of course, a vaccine that needs to be given on a monthly "booster" basis, as the
current version of the cocaine vaccine seems to require, may be fundamentally similar to a
monthly depot injection of a drug like naltrexone in the duration of its effects and thus the
number of decision-points at which a person can terminate or alter their treatment. See, e.g.,
Phil Skolnick & Nora D. Volkow, Addiction Therapeutics: Obstacles and Opportunities, 72
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 890, 891 (2012).
62. Bridget A. Martell et al., Vaccine Pharmacotherapy for the Treatment of Cocaine
Dependence, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 158, 158 (2005).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 162; see also Laurent Karila et al., New Treatments for Cocaine Dependence:
A Focused Review, 11 INT'L J. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 425 (2008).
66. Bridget A. Martell et al., Cocaine Vaccine for the Treatment of Cocaine Dependence
in Methadone-Maintained Patients: A Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled
Efficacy Trial, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1116, 1116 (2009).
67. Id.
68. Margaret Haney et al., Cocaine-Specific Antibodies Blunt the Subjective Effect of
Smoked Cocaine in Humans, 67 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 59, 59 (2010).
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amounts of cocaine in hopes of overcoming its effects," and blood tests of
these participants reported up to ten times more cocaine after vaccination
than was found in pre-vaccine urine samples. 69 Not only is this type of
outcome ineffective (and in fact the exact opposite of the desired result) in
terms of behavioral control, but also presents a serious danger of overdose
and death from systemic cocaine effects, such as elevated heart rate and
cardiac arrest. Researchers and pharmaceutical companies are still
pursuing vaccine development with the goal of achieving versions that
require less frequent dosing and have more effective immunogenic profiles
in a larger proportion of a treated population.70 Similar vaccines are also
under development for nicotine7 1 , heroin 72 , and methamphetamine7 1, and
optimism abounds at leading federal research institutions for their
availability within the next decade.74
3. Actual Treatment: Direct Modification of Drug-Related
Conditioned Associations
A final example of future neuroscience-based therapies for drug
addiction has not yet been discussed in the legal literature. Research and
development is in very early stages of human subject experimentation.
Scientists are exploring direct modification of the powerful memories
created when drugs hijack normal learning and memory systems, with the
therapeutic goal of effectively rewiring such pathways so that the
drug-related conditioned associations no longer exert such a powerful grip
on behavioral responses by stimulating craving and drug-seeking.
The underlying neural phenomenon, known as "reconsolidation," is a
process by which associations are strengthened or diminished via
modifications of intracellular signaling mechanisms and synaptic




71. Xinyuan Chen et al., High Immunogenicity of Nicotine Vaccines Obtained by
Intradermal Delivery with Safe Adjuvants, 31 VACCNE 154 (2012).
72. Paul T. Bremer & Kim D. Janda, Investigating the Effects of a Hydrolytically Stable
Hapten and a Th1 Adjuvant on Heroin Vaccine Performance, 55 J. MED. CHEM. 10776
(2012).
73. Michelle L. Miller et al., A Methamphetamine Vaccine Attenuated
Methamphetamine-Induced Disruptions in Thermoregulation and Activity in Rats, 73
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 721 (2013).
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(neuron-to-neuron) connective efficiency. Reconsolidation is "the process
by which memories, destabilized at retrieval, require restabilization to
persist in the brain." This restabilization requirement presents a
therapeutic target for disruption by interfering with the cellular-level
processes of gene expression and protein transcription that appear to be
necessary for the cementing process after destabilization.n Rather than
being limited to recent memories, reconsolidation seems to happen to even
old, well-established, and fundamental memory processes, particularly
Pavlovian-type conditioning mechanisms known to be critical to the
development of compulsive drug-seeking and taking behavior. Milton
and Everitt present a model for therapeutic intervention based on "three
routes to relapse," targeting the effects that drugs of abuse have on
Pavlovian conditioning systems of conditioned reinforcement, conditioned
approach, and conditioned motivation.79
76. See Amy L. Milton & Barry J. Everitt, The Psychological and Neurochemical
Mechanisms ofDrug Memory Reconsolidation: Implications for the Treatment ofAddiction,
31 EUR. J. NEUROSCI. 2308, 2308 (2010), for a review summarizing the animal literature.
See also Jane R. Taylor, Peter Olausson, Jennifer J. Quinn & Mary M. Torregrossa,
Targeting Extinction and Reconsolidation Mechanisms to Combat the Impact ofDrug Cues
on Addiction, 56 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY, (Supp. 1), 186 (2009).
77. Jonathan L.C. Lee, Barry J. Everitt & Kerrie L. Thomas, Independent Cellular
Processes for IHippocampal Memory Consolidation and Reconsolidation, 304 Sci. 839, 843
(2004); Jonathan L.C. Lee et al., Disrupting Reconsolidation of Drug Memories Reduces
Cocaine Seeking Behavior, 47 NEURON 795 (2005); Jonathan L.C. Lee, Amy L. Milton &
Barry J. Everitt, Cue-Induced Cocaine Seeking and Relapse are Reduced by Disruption of
Drug Memory Reconsolidation, 26 J. NEUROSCI. 5581 (2006).
78. Milton & Everitt, supra note 76.
79. Id. at 2312, Figure 4. "CS" means "conditioned stimulus," which refers to a cue that
the animal has come to associate with drug availability. In the real world, any number of
things may serve as a conditioned stimulus for addicts: a person, place, or thing or even
sensations such as particular smells, tastes, and emotions may become associated with
drug-seeking and taking behavior.
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"The 'three routes to relapse' produced by the effects of [P]avlovian dru Lassociated
conditioned stimuli over instrumental drug-seeking and relapse behaviour [sic]."
Each route is neurally dissociable from the others and has the potential
to modulate the likelihood of drug-seeking relapse triggered by various
conditioned stimuli present in the user's environment . Milton and Everitt
emphasize that while such dissociable mechanisms increase understanding
of the neural pathways of addiction in highly-controlled laboratory animals,
real-life addiction therapies should attempt to target all three to be most
effective against the complex psychological aspects of addiction subserved
by each system.82 Several pharmacological strategies are being explored
that target reconsolidation mechanisms, such as direct administration of
protein kinase inhibitors and targeting of specific glutamatergic
neurotransmitter receptors that modulate intracellular gene expression and
protein synthesis. 83  Reconsolidation strategies have found other
therapeutic targets and early successes in pharmacological and behavioral
treatments for post-traumatic stress disorder.84
Remarkably, recent work in humans has applied purely behavioral
approaches to reconsolidation, without the use of pharmacological
80. Id. at 2312.
81. Id. at 2308.
82. Id. at 2314.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Alain Brunet et al., Effect of Post-Retrieval Propranolol on
Psychophysiologic Responding During Subsequent Script-Driven Traumatic Imagery in
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 42 J. PSYCHIATRY. RES. 503, 505-06 (2008); Merel Kindt,
Marieke Soeter & Brain Vervliet, Beyond Extinction: Erasing Human Fear Responses and
Preventing the Return ofFear, 12 NATURE NEUROSCI. 256, 257-28 (2009); Daniela Schiller
et al., Preventing the Return of Fear in Humans Using Reconsolidation Update
Mechanisms, 463 NATURE 49, 52 (2010), available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7277/full/nature08637.htnl.
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interference.85 This study applied a behavioral approach used in animals
called the "memory retrieval-extinction" procedure, which takes advantage
of a narrow window of time in which "reactivated" memories seem to be
labile, such that behavioral interference prevents their reconsolidation." In
a population of in-patient detoxified heroin addicts, the procedure using a
10-minute delay reduced heroin cue-induced craving (measured by
self-report) and cue-induced blood pressure, as compared to the same
procedure using a 6-hour delay.87 This effect persisted even up to 184 days
beyond the treatment session. Clearly further work is needed, but the
promise of a purely behavioral, non-pharmacological approach to treating
addiction is an exciting prospect, and one that does not present many of the
concerns outlined below in Parts II and III. Whether or not robust clinical
development of such a treatment takes place without the financial
incentives present for pharmacological therapies remains to be seen.89
Targeting reconsolidation mechanisms as a "pro-abstinence,
anti-relapse" treatment for drug abuse may offer the first direct approach to
manipulate the root neurobiological cause of persistent drug-seeking and
taking behaviors. Rather than symptom treatment or antagonism of the
drug itself, direct neural modification of drug-related memories promises to
come closest to a "cure" by re-wiring the hijacked neural mechanisms that
can otherwise lead to such profound reshaping of behavior such that relapse
is considered all but inevitable. The benefits to such an approach are
obvious:
[T]reatments based upon the disruption of reconsolidation would
be predicted to require few, and possibly even a single, treatment
with a memory-disrupting drug in order to increase the likelihood
of long-lasting abstinence from drugs of abuse. This would clearly
be advantageous in avoiding the compliance and tolerance issues
associated with more extended, prophylactic anti-relapse
treatments. 90
The challenges of this approach, however, may be equally profound.
The learning and memory systems hijacked by drugs of abuse are core
elements of all learned behavior. Manipulating drug-based memories in
85. Yan-Xue Xue et al., A Memory Retrieval-Extinction Procedure to Prevent Drug
Craving and Relapse, 336 SCIENCE 241 (2012).
86. Amy L. Milton & Barry J. Everitt, Wiping Drug Memories, 336 SCIENCE 167 (2012).
87. Xue et al., supra note 85, at 243.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Skolnick & Volkow, supra note 61.
90. Milton & Everitt supra note 76, at 2316.
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dynamic social and complex organisms may come with serious
side-effects, such as significant changes in memories, personality, or even
sense of personal identity. Early cross-species behavioral studies in
humans, such as the Xue paper cited above, provide a sense of optimism
that such therapies could be both highly targeted and minimally or non-
invasive. Animal research in drug addiction should be closely watched by
the therapeutic jurisprudence community, as the behavioral models used to
study addiction are extremely sophisticated and designed to have maximum
translational value. Therapies that directly modify, diminish, or erase
drug-related memories are in the research and development pipeline and
represent a significant shift in therapeutic strategy that attempts to
capitalize on a detailed understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying
drug addiction.
II. IMPACT OF NOVEL TECHNIQUES AND THERAPIES FROM
NEUROSCIENCE ON THE CURRENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
TREATMENT ADMINISTRATION THROUGH DRUG AND PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS
Novel therapies from neuroscience are likely to have the most
substantial impact on the criminal justice system by expanding the range of
rehabilitative strategies available to sentencing or diversionary programs.
In particular, drug and problem-solving courts may prove to be a major
point of entry for such therapies into the criminal justice system, given
these courts' flexibility and creativity with respect to adopting intensive
monitoring and treatment programs with motivated offenders. 9'
91. In 1997, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals and the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs published the ten "key components" of
drug courts, which serve as the defining elements of drug courts and offers performance
benchmarks to guide implementation. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 205621, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS (reprt. 2004) (Jan.
1997). The ten key components are:
- Integration of substance abuse treatment with justice system case processing.
- Use of a nonadversarial approach, in which prosecution and defense promote public
safety with protecting the right of the accused to due process.
- Early identification and prompt placement of eligible participants.
- Access to a continuum of treatment, rehabilitation, and related services.
- Frequent testing for alcohol and illicit drugs.
- A coordinated strategy among the judge, prosecution, defense, and treatment
providers to govern offender compliance.
- Ongoing judicial interaction with each participant.
- Monitoring and evaluation to measure achievement of program goals and gauge
effectiveness.
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Drug courts have been called the "the most significant penal innovation
in the last twenty years." 92 Drug courts have proliferated since their
inception in 1989, and have "received almost uniformly positive media
coverage and overwhelming support at both the national and local levels." 9 3
Much has been written about how drug courts work, which will not be
repeated here other than to refer the reader to materials cited herein, where
detailed background information is available. Broadly speaking, drug
courts exist alongside the normal penal system, and eligible offenders are
given the choice to participate in lieu of traditional adjudication. Some
courts are deferred-prosecution, while others operate post conviction, after
an offender pleads guilty in exchange for a deferred sentence pending
successful participation in the drug court. 94 As discussed below, different
courts use different eligibility criteria: being an "addict," having no or no
violent prior offenses, and not participating in a gang are some of the set of
criteria drug courts employ. 95 Once accepted, participants are required to
complete the treatment regime overseen by a judge, with in-court status
meetings, random drug tests, rewards and sanctions, and other
"assignments" seemingly limited only by the court's creativity. 96 Programs
typically last 12-18 months.9 7
This section outlines the structure of a cost-benefit analysis of
integrating such therapies into the current criminal justice system via drug
courts, and particularly considers the implications for currently used
modalities for drug treatment. This analysis is an illustrative framework
rather than proscriptive. Part III explains why a thorough policy
consideration of how to incorporate novel treatments from neuroscience
into the criminal justice system must go beyond the analytical framework
presented in this section, towards a fuller discussion of fundamental
principles and procedures of drug courts or other criminal justice policy
mechanisms.
- Continuing interdisciplinary education to promote effective planning,
implementation, and operation.
- Partnerships with public agencies and community-based organizations to generate
local support and enhance drug court effectiveness.
92. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Problem ofJudicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1481 (2004).
93. JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 5 (2001). Doug Husak "see[s] little in the media since the publication of
Nolan's book to change this verdict about the level of public support for the drug court
movement." Husak, supra note 4, at 230, n.4.
94. See Husak, supra note 4.
95. Id.
96. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 3, at 7.
97. Id.
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A. Potential Benefits: Improved Effectiveness Above and Beyond
Current Court-Ordered Drug Treatment Programs?
Two variables critical for assessing how novel therapeutic options
might impact success rates vary widely amongst drug courts. These two
major variables are (1) the treatment modalities used and (2) participant
acceptance criteria. Indeed, one commentator has noted that "drug courts
differ so much that generalizations are perilous."9 Few meaningful
empirical assessments can be made about the effectiveness of particular
program elements without these baselines.
With respect to the treatment program variable, a comprehensive
review of the empirical drug court literature concluded that "[flew
evaluations have provided analysis on how the modality of treatment that
drug court participants receive impacts their rates of success." 99 Typically,
courts partner with community-based programs licensed by the state to
provide substance abuse treatment services that tend to rely heavily on
behaviorally-centered programs including counseling, twelve-step
programs such as Narcotics Anonymous, and, to a lesser extent, structured
cognitive behavioral therapy.1" Treatment services are used in as part of
the integrated drug court program, in conjunction with judicial monitoring,
frequent drug testing, and delivery of rewards and sanctions in the
courtroom. 10 Lack of quality assurance of treatment service providers has
been a concern echoed in the drug court policy literature.102 This concern
was cited by the National Institute of Justice as the major implication of a
comprehensive study assessing the efficacy of treatment modalities:
[T]he research identifies deficiencies and problems in the way that
treatment programs are delivered and suggests that drug courts may
actually be shortchanging their clients in important respects . . .
improvements are clearly needed in treatment content, access, and
98. Husak, supra note 4, at 217.
99. RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Drug Courts: A
Review of the Evidence (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dpdrugcourts.pdf.
100. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 91.
101. See id.
102. Faith E. Lutze & Jacqueline G. van Wormer, The Nexus Between Drug and Alcohol
Treatment Program Integrity and Drug Court Effectiveness: Policy Recommendations for
Pursuing Success, 18 CRIM. J. POL'Y R. 226, 227 (2007) ("Although process evaluations
have described the extent to which [the integration of alcohol and other drug treatment
services within justice system case processing] has been successfully implemented . . . and
most note the importance of treatment integrity to the process, few have actually attempted
to measure the quality of the treatment provided to drug court participants and the impact
that this may have on outcomes.) (internal citations omitted).
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delivery; program integration; and program integrity so that drug
courts can increase retention rates and achieve longer term
reductions in drug use and criminal activity.'0o
The second variable, participant eligibility and acceptance criteria, is
also a critical but missing piece of data for an empirical analysis of how
novel therapies from neuroscience might improve the efficacy of
drug-court mandated treatments. While "[e]arly identification and prompt
placement of eligible participants"' 0 is one of the key components of a
drug court, the assessment methods and acceptance criteria vary
substantially between courts. 05 Even setting aside legal status elements of
drug court enrollment criteria (such as no prior felonies, charges of drug
dealing, or violent offenses) some commentators have criticized drug
courts for "skimming" participants who do not, in fact, have serious
addiction problems and for whom any "treatment" program is likely to
succeed. 10 6 For such participants, it seems possible that enhanced therapies
from neuroscience may offer no marginal benefit. On the other hand, for
participants with serious drug addiction problems, the medically-intensive
pharmaceutical, vaccination, or drug-memory modification therapies
discussed above may boost the effectiveness of counseling, monitoring, and
twelve-step programs. Thus, adoption of such therapies may permit or
even require drug courts to admit participants with more serious problems
who could derive the greatest marginal benefits from such treatments as a
matter of economic efficiency.
With respect to their primary outcome measures, drug courts have
proven to be effective at reducing criminal recidivism and cost-effective in
their use of criminal justice system resources. 07  Measuring recidivism,
103. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND DECADE,
20 (2006) (reporting on findings from Anspach & Ferguson, supra note 37), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/211081.pdf
104. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 3.
105. Id. at 5.
106. NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE
CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 12 (2009); see also Miller,
supra note 92, at 1541-42.
107. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS:
EVIDENCE INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES
44, 72 (2005); see also 2 C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III, DOUGLAS E. MARLOWE & RACHEL
CASEBOLT, NAT'L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 6-7 (2008) (reporting substantial net cost saving per participant ranging from around
$4,700 in Washington State drug courts to over $12,000 in a single court in Multnomah
County, Oregon); HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 3, at 9-10 (reporting savings to the
criminal justice system of $2.21 to $3.36 for every $1.00 invested, with greater savings
achieved when targeted at higher risk offenders).
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however, does not necessarily capture the public health aspect of drug use.
With respect to actually reducing participants' substance use, the limited
data available on relapse rates (from only eight courts out of the
twenty-seven surveyed by the GAO report) has shown mixed results, with
modest reductions in use shown by drug test results contradicted by
participants' self-reported data. 08
Which measure is considered to be more salient as an outcome for
policy analysis depends in part on the purpose and goals of the drug court
system. As part of the criminal justice system, the outcome measure more
salient for evaluating drug courts' overall effectiveness is the reduction in a
participant's interactions with the system: reduced recidivism. From both a
criminal justice and a public health and safety perspective, however, it is
arguable that reduction in drug use-reduced relapse-is a more desirable
outcome measure because it captures both improved health consequences
and concomitant reductions in illegal activity (drug purchase, sale, and
possession) that could land a participant back in custody. Thus,
improvements in treatment options provided by advances in neuroscience
that have the direct outcome of reducing drug use could conceivably
enhance both outcome measures. Indeed, implementation of more intense
medical procedures as part of treatment modalities should stimulate more
drug courts to collect data on substance use rates and set benchmarks for
relapse reductions as a primary goal, with the justification that reduction in
drug use is an outcome measure of effectiveness that captures all of the
goals of drug court rehabilitative programs. If drug courts are currently
effective (both statistically, as compared to the traditional criminal justice
model, and from a cost perspective) at reducing recidivism but not at
reducing actual substance use, it is conceivable that improvement of
treatment modalities via novel therapies from neuroscience could only
further improve outcomes by supporting reductions in relapse rates.
B. Potential Costs: Conflict With Current Treatment Systems and
Overuse of Medically Intensive Resources in the Courtroom
Adopting novel therapies from neuroscience into treatment programs
used by drug courts would not be without substantial challenges. First and
foremost, the therapies must be proven to be safe and effective, with side
effect and risk profiles that are tolerable for participants. Beyond basic
safety measures, however, the implementation of highly medicalized
treatment modalities into a system that relies heavily on in-court
monitoring and programs using therapies informed by different
108. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 107, at 60.
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philosophies of drug addiction may create conflict within an individual's
treatment regimen that reduces overall efficacy. For example, the National
Institute of Justice sponsored a review of treatment delivery services in four
drug courts and found that programs using multiple approaches to
treatment simultaneously "lacked coherence and were based on
incompatible philosophies," resulting in "messages to participants [that]
were often inconsistent."109 As an example of incompatible treatment
philosophies with opposing theories of the etiology of drug abuse, drug
court participants may participate in a twelve-step program, "which
advocates that participants recognize they lack the strength or resources to
control their addiction and turn their lives over to a higher power," while
simultaneously receiving cognitive behavioral therapy, which "requires
participants to recognize and examine the role played by thoughts and
emotions in perpetuating addictive behavior and take control of internal
processes by learning new social, emotional, and cognitive skills.""o
Therapies coming from neuroscience research may be perceived by
participants as rooted in a medicalized philosophy of a neurobiological
basis of addiction, particularly the "addiction as a brain disease" etiological
theory of drug abuse."' This approach may prove to be incompatible with
either the twelve-step program or a cognitive behavioral therapy program,
depending in part on how a participant perceives their own agency to be
affected by a behaviorally-manifesting "brain disease" and the extent to
which supportive services demand that a participant exercise that agency.112
It is not known how therapies like pharmacological treatment, vaccines,
and selective memory modification would work within a holistic treatment
program. It seems possible, however, that incompatible or contradictory
philosophies about drug abuse etiology and recovery could impede
compliance and treatment effectiveness.
109. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 15-16.
110. Id. at 16.
111. Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, and it Matters, 278 Sci. 47 (1997). Dr.
Leshner, CEO of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and former
director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, argues "[Addiction] is a brain disease for
which the social contexts in which it has both developed and is expressed are critically
important. . . . Understanding addiction as a brain disease explains in part why historic
policy strategies focusing solely on the social or criminal justice aspects of drug use and
addiction have been unsuccessful. They are missing at least half of the issue. If the brain is
the core of the problem, attending to the brain needs to be a core part of the solution." Id. at
46-47.
112. See generally NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT
FOR CRIM. JUSTICE POPULATIONS (rev. ed. 2012) (2006) (proposing a coherent theoretical
model for a drug court employing neuroscience-derived therapeutic measures), available at
www.drugabuse.gov/PODATCJ/principles.
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While neuroscience-based therapeutic advances may help treat more
serious cases of substance abuse, they will also come with increased costs
for the treatments themselves and for expanded medical staff to deliver
them as part of court-mandated treatment programs. At present,
behavioral therapies in treatment programs can be administered by
counselors who may not be extensively educated or professionally
licensed.113 In the future, any pharmacological or vaccine-based treatment,
such as those forecasted above, will be an FDA-regulated drug or device
that must be administered by clinically-trained staff who thoroughly
understand the appropriate use, contraindications, and related risks and side
effects. At present, narcotics treatment programs using substitution or
aversion therapies as described above are licensed and regulated by state
and federal law, and overseen by a licensed medical doctor. 114 In addition
to the costs of novel drugs and devices patented and marketed by
pharmaceutical companies, the costs of maintaining highly-trained clinical
staff to prescribe the administration of novel therapies may substantially
change the cost-effective balance of current drug court programs. Some
costs may be offset by raising program fees levied on drug court
participants, including perhaps making certain therapies available on the
basis of ability to pay for a substantial portion of the treatment. At the
same time, new and more expensive therapies may reveal the limits of drug
court economic viability. For example, funding ceilings that limit the
outlays drug courts can make for treatment may not be high enough to
permit the investment needed to capture back-end benefits of such
significant reductions in relapse and recidivism with more seriously
affected participants. Moreover, such therapies may provide only
incremental effectiveness, and without concurrent screening programs to
predict the likelihood of a given outcome for an individual (at an additional
cost), there is the potential for significant waste of expensive medical and
court resources on ineffective or only marginally effective treatments.
The areas of cost-benefit analysis described above are just some of the
major analyses that would have to be informed by empirical data on safety,
effectiveness, and costs before novel therapies from neuroscience should be
adopted into current drug court practices.
113. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 14. See also Lutze & van Wormer, supra
note 102, at 236 ("[I]t is well known that drug and alcohol treatment staff members are often
underpaid, lack a college education or certification related to the treatments that they
provide, receive no healthcare benefits, and receive minimal in-service training
opportunities.").
114. See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Alcohol & Drug Programs, Frequently Asked Questions,
CA.GOv, http://www.adp.ca.gov/Licensing/faqs.shtml (last visited Sep. 2, 2012) (describing
the various licensing requirements for both public and private alcohol and drug treatment
providers).
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III. PARADIGM SHIFTS: RE-EXAMINING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCPLES OF
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Rather than simply be shoehorned into existing practice models, novel
therapies from neuroscience that treat drug addiction should force a deeper
examination of the purposes, principles, and procedures used in drug and
problem-solving courts. There are two categories of pragmatic reasons
behind this: those deriving from institutional issues, and those deriving
from the scientific differences in forthcoming treatments that raise
questions of the appropriateness of deploying complex, medically invasive
procedures within a criminal justice context of leveraged treatment. These
types of issues interact in ways that necessitate a broader, top-down
discussion of how the entire system should be organized. Without such a
discussion, such scientific advances risk being misused as panaceas for
other institutional problems, with potentially dire consequences that might
undermine the entire system." 5  Moreover, the prospect of "curing"
addiction through public health measures delivered in the shadow of the
criminal justice system risks foreclosing a debate about that which ties the
two together: drug criminalization." 6
Criminologists Lutze and van Wormer foreshadowed the difficulties of
adopting complex new technologies as part of attempts to reform offender
treatment and corrections programs by looking back at historical changes in
rehabilitative approaches adopted by enthusiastic and well-meaning
reformers. "Change often resulted in what was convenient to the
existing institutions and their practices resulting in the abandonment of the
components of the innovation that were too complex or required an
expertise beyond the capabilities of the implementers.""' 8  This analysis
seems particularly prescient with respect to complex technologies such as
brain-based predictive measures and vaccines, or memory-modification to
treat problematic behavior. Despite their sophistication, none of these
115. See, e.g., Lutze & van Wormer, supra note 102, at 230 ("[T]he court needs to assure
that the process and programs that offenders participate in are accessible, relevant, and of
quality-if not, then both the court and the defendant and are likely to fail ... .[T]he theory
and mission underlying the program must be implemented in a way that produces the
intended outcomes.").
116. Doug Husak has hit on the same point via an examination of the political and
philosophical justifications for drug courts: "[Drug c]ourts would have no opportunity to
dispense therapeutic justice to offenders unless drug use (or, more technically, drug
possession) were proscribed throughout the United States. The jurisdiction of these courts
presupposes the commission of a crime. Hence, the deepest question-rarely mentinoed in
the literature about the drug court movement-is that of criminalization. If drug use were
not a criminal offense, drug courts would not exist." Husak, supra note 4, at 219.
117. Lutze & van Wormer, supra note 102, at 230.
118. Id.at227-28.
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technologies may be expected to work as a magic bullet for the complex
psychosocial, cultural, economic, and other factors that precipitate and
sustain antisocial behavior such as drug addiction, and all will require
careful integration with other support mechanisms that are the key
components of drug courts. Moreover, such technologies will require
advanced medical expertise and a theoretically coherent integrated
treatment paradigm, as half-measures with invasive procedures hold the
potential for more severe collateral consequences for a participant.
Beyond the analysis in Part II, the complexity of the treatments should
prompt drug courts to take a critical look at their institutional competencies
as a biobehavioral medical services provider, and whether the entire
treatment and monitoring program must be adjusted to incorporate
neuroscientific understandings of the causes and consequences of substance
abuse." 9
The analysis, however, must go even further. Rather than only asking
how neuroscience technologies could be effectively integrated into drug
courts-indeed a complex question in and of itself-the potential risks and
benefits promised by new technologies should shift the essential question
to: are drug courts the right way to tackle the problem?
The beginning of the answer to that question must be a disaggregation
of "the problem." Drug courts treat substance use and addiction as a
criminal justice problem and a public health problem. Previous
commentators have criticized drug and other problem-solving courts as a
political panacea to deeper, under-examined problems of drug
criminalization law, and moreover assert that such courts step beyond their
limited jurisdiction and institutional competency into realms of medical
treatment. These concerns are reignited and perhaps enhanced by
technologies that may be invasive to the point of undue infringements on
personal liberty and autonomy, which in turn raises questions about the
protective legal mechanisms of due process and separation of powers.
The terrain is a confusing mix of theoretical, doctrinal, practical, and
normative issues. Each of these domains will be discussed below as
relatively discrete topics, though with overlapping concerns: the legal and
ethical issues in leveraged treatment paradigms, the implications of
unprecedented biological invasions on autonomy and personal liberty, and
the appropriateness and effectiveness of a "therapeutic jurisprudence"
doctrinal justification for drug courts in the face of expanded demands and
capabilities. None of these problems has a satisfactory resolution, and thus
raises the ultimate question: if new technologies might effectively treat a
119. For a thorough discussion of the theoretical incoherence of drug courts, in terms of
treating addiction as a disease but participants as responsible agents receptive to external
incentives, see Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REv. 783 (2008).
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biobehavioral public health problem but cannot do so effectively within a
criminal justice apparatus, is the mixed criminal justice/public health
approach still appropriate? Some may consider it ironic that advances in
addiction therapies once again raise the question of drug criminalization
policy, but this is exactly the root of all the complex issues discussed in this
section.
A. Legal and Ethical Issues in Leveraged Treatment Paradigms: A
Starting Point
Drug courts operate on an opt-in, voluntary basis for those offenders
who meet eligibility criteria; offenders can choose to have their case
processed through the normal adversarial system and typical incarceration
punishment if they do not want to agree to the contractual terms of drug
court participation. An unassailable legal principle at work in this context
is that every competent individual has a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, and this right may only be overridden if it serves crucial
government interests.120 This principle mirrors the ethical commitment to
personal autonomy and informed consent set forth in the Belmont Report, a
seminal 1979 publication that set the modern standards in medical ethics
that guide public health regulations. 12 1
Several legal and policy scholars have explored the terrain of leveraged
treatment for addiction that serves as a starting point for thinking about
advanced therapies from neuroscience such as those discussed in Part I.
Court-mandated, involuntary treatment with medically invasive therapies
for convicted offenders, even as a condition of probation or parole, must
overcome a strong showing of necessity (based on a crucial state interest)
and effectiveness to be constitutionally permissible.' 22  Voluntary
arrangements, where accused or convicted offenders may choose to accept
available treatment, pose fewer legal problems. Leveraged agreements,
particularly those taking the form of contractual arrangements using the
threat of criminal prosecution or incarceration as an incentive, venture into
the gray area of coercion versus informed choice and consent. Drug courts
have delicately straddled this boundary by providing treatments and
120. Bonnie, supra note 48, at 73. See Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 210
(1990), for Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to refuse medical treatment.
121. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDuC. & WELFARE, PUB. Nos. 78-0013 & 78-0014, THE BELMONT REPORT:
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH (1979), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.html.
122. Bonnie, supra note 48, at 78.
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services on a contractual basis. Under these contracts, lapses in the
participant's voluntary compliance with conditions are sanctioned with jail,
or even termination of drug court participation and reversion to traditional
prosecution or serving a deferred sentence, depending on the procedural
model of the court.
Legal scholar Richard Bonnie has explored how the opiate antagonist
naltrexone could be offered to addicted offenders in a leveraged-treatment
paradigm involving plea or parole agreements that do not
unconstitutionally coerce because they expand a defendant's available
options (accept treatment or go to jail) rather than constricting them. 123
Even if such options are presented as choices, however, "policy makers
have an obligation to look behind consents to make sure that addicted
individuals are fully informed of the risks and benefits [of vaccines for
addiction] . . . particularly in coercive environments, it will be important
to insure that informed consent procedures are more than a legal hurdle
surmounted by a consent form."l 2 4 The National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers recently published an extensive commentary on drug
courts, focusing particularly on due process concerns raised by differences
in procedural models (such as pre- or post-plea and adjudication
distinctions) that may require defendants to waive important constitutional
rights to be accepted into a drug court without enough time or information
to make a fully informed decision.125 When invasive therapies are simply
added to the arsenal that drug treatment courts may offer to or wield over a
defendant, the need for procedural protections grows in direct proportion to
the potential consequences for medically significant outcomes and undue
burdens on a person's bodily integrity or decisional autonomy.
B. Advanced Biological Invasions on Autonomy and Personal Liberty:
Differences in Kind or in Degree?
There are no clear bright-line legal rules or principles as to what types
of medical treatments, administered in what types of legal contexts,
constitute impermissible intrusions upon a person's autonomy and personal
123. Bonnie, supra note 48, at 81-83 (resting discussion on the holding in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970), where the Supreme Court held that plea agreements are
not unconstitutionally compelled "whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept
the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities
extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime
charged.").
124. M. Susan Ridgely & Martin Y. Iguchi, Coercive Use of Vaccines Against Drug
Addiction: Is it Permissible and is it Good Public Policy?, 12 VA. J. Soc. POt'Y & L. 260,
328 (2004).
125. NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., supra note 106.
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liberty, other than the occasional extreme example of a procedure that
"shocks the conscience."l 2 6  After all, all conditions imposed by plea
agreements or behavioral contracts put restrictions on a person's liberty and
autonomy, and convicted offenders lose their liberty and some degrees of
autonomy as part of their punishment. Furthermore, all punishments such
as incarceration restrict a person's bodily autonomy and undoubtedly have
experiential effects on brain plasticity. As Professor Hank Greely has
noted:
I see no qualitative difference between acting directly to change a
criminal's brain . . . through drugs, surgery . . . or vaccines, if
proven safe and effective[-]and acting indirectly[-]through
punishment, rehabilitation, cognitive therapy, parole conditions[-
]to achieve similar ends. It is true that we understand better the
likely effects of the traditional methods of trying to change
criminals' behavior, including their strong likelihood of failure.
Ignorance of a direct intervention's safety and efficacy would
certainly be an important strike against its use, but if the
intervention is proven safe and effective (again, to whatever
standards one applies), direct and indirect interventions seem to me
not importantly different.127
At present, it is unclear whether the direct or indirect nature of a
court-mandated or court-supplied intervention matters in terms of any clear
legal and ethical principles. Indeed, even the terms "direct" and "indirect"
are unclear as to what causal pathway or point on a given pathway they
refer to. There are hints that legal scholars think that such a dividing line
between "direct" and "indirect" treatments may be at interventions that
directly impact the central nervous system. 128 On the other hand, as
Professor Greely points out, these may be differences in degree rather than
in kind, because all interventions that impact behavior end up changing the
brain's plasticity in experience-dependent ways.12 9
126. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
127. See Greely, supra note 15, at 1134.
128. For example, Richard Bonnie takes pains to point out that naltrexone may be
distinguished from other forms of medically coerced treatments, such as chemical castration
for sex offenders and anti-psychotic medications for incompetent offenders who pose a
danger to themselves or others because "naltrexone does not produce any lasting changes in
the patient's brain or personality - it simply reduces craving for heroin and alcohol." Bonnie,
supra note 48, at 71.
129. Contra CENTER FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY AND ETHICS, THREATS TO COGNITIVE
LIBERTY: PHARMACOTHERAPY AND THE FUTURE OF THE DRUG WAR (2004), available at
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/pdflPharmacotherapy%202004.pdf (criticizing compulsory
pharmacotherapy). An affiliate of the Center for Cognitive Liberty's likened
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There are several components to an analysis of whether long-lasting or
brain-manipulative therapies are intrusions upon liberty and bodily or
personal integrity in legally and ethically significant ways. The first is to
distinguish whether a participant choosing them is making a fully informed
decision from all angles: his legal rights, likelihood of effectiveness,
potential side effects, and permanency or duration of all available
treatments or options. It also makes a difference whether the person is
making this decision with the state's police power forcing or merely
guiding him among the various options, and at what point the state offers or
forecloses an option. In this sense, leveraged treatment within deferred
prosecution models for drug courts is legally distinct from post-conviction
mandates for sex offenders or the mentally incompetent and dangerous to
accept treatment as a condition of sentencing. 130
Advances in neuroscience (leading to long-lasting or permanent effects
after acute administration or that have collateral consequences of memory
or personality modification) shift the burdens on informed consent in two
crucial ways. First, they require a person to be able to rationally consider
long-term and uncertain outcomes with respect to fundamental issues of
identity and agency. Second, they heighten the risk of therapeutic
misconception by offering scientifically sophisticated treatments with
potentially variable outcomes. Hypothetically, a defendant may be too
quick to waive important constitutional rights because he thinks that a new
neurotechnology might cure his addiction, when in fact, outcomes may be
different or less than hoped for and relapse results in criminal punishment
anyway such that he may have been better off in the adversarial system. It
seems doubtful that defense counsel would be well-equipped to advise a
client, as the "best interests" calculus would become significantly more
complex and uncertain.131 This is but one of many potentially risky
scenarios that advances in neuroscience technologies to treat addiction and
pharmacotherapy for drug addiction to an unprecedented expansion of state power by
moving "from external policing to internal policing, and ... from restraining a person's
physical body and behavior to directly restraining a person's brain function and thought
processes." Richard G. Boire, Neurocops: The Politics of Prohibition and the Future of
Enforcing Social Policy from Inside the Body, 19 J.L. & HEALTH 215, 257 (2004).
130. Cf Bonnie, supra note 48, at 72, n.50.
131. This is a complication in addition to that already faced by defense lawyers
participating in drug courts, where "[z]ealous advocacy is easily misconstrued as denial and
a counterproductive unwillingness to provide one's client with the help he allegedly needs."
Husak, supra note 4 at 220. See also Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway?
Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 37, 47 (2000-2001) (noting that the defender must modify or mute her
traditional role, "take a step back, [and] to not intervene actively between the judge and the
participant . . . [to] allow that relationship to develop and do its work.) (citation
omitted); NAT'L Ass'N OF Cui. DEF. LAW., supra note 106.
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antisocial behavior may present. Rather than simplifying addiction
treatment with advanced technology and greasing the wheels of drug court
functioning, such novel therapies complicate the analysis about appropriate
balances between relinquishing rights and accepting increasingly invasive
interventions in exchange.
C. Beyond Beneficence: Greater Risks Should Reinvigorate Structural
and Procedural Protections to Preserve Institutional Legitimacy
About a decade ago, a handful of voices in the legal and policy
literature sparred vigorously over the benefits of therapeutic jurisprudence
practiced by drug courts and the risks of institutional overreach and
misallocation of resources. 132 The latter's critique was founded in criticism
of the dual and conflicted nature of drug courts, voiced perhaps most
strongly by Judge Morris Hoffman of the Second Judicial District in
Denver, Colorado:
By existing simply to appease two so diametric and irreconcilable
sets of principles [law enforcement and medical treatment], drug
courts are fundamentally unprincipled. By simultaneously treating
drug use as a crime and as a disease, without coming to grips with
the inherent contradictions of those two approaches, drug courts
are not satisfying either the legitimate and compassionate interests
of the treatment community or the legitimate and rational interests
of the law enforcement community. 133
Despite their reported successes, drug courts should still be subjected
to doctrinal scrutiny that sets boundary conditions on their current
theoretical foundation in "therapeutic jurisprudence."l 34 While therapeutic
jurisprudence advocates claim that drug court-administered "treatment
regimes are not punishment, but the restructuring of the defendant's
lifestyle," drug courts are administering such regimes within the shadows
of threatened punishments by a confluence of state powers. 3s In such a
132. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1437, 1477
(2000).
133. Id. Hoffman drew his argument in part from an earlier article published by Richard
Boldt that examines the theoretical underpinnings of the drug courts' departure from the
traditional adversarial model. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1205 passim (1998).
134. Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal
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framework, Judge Hoffman sees serious threats to institutional legitimacy
and risks of negative outcomes when courts overstep bounds of separation
of powers (and their own training) and tread simultaneously on legislative
public health policy functions and executive punishment functions:
[D]rug courts are not simply using the traditional powers of
bond conditions, deferred judgment, and probation conditions.
They are using these traditional judicial powers in a way that is not
only non-traditional, but in fact not even judicial. The very
purpose of the drug court is not to resolve criminal liability, but to
use the threat of criminal liability to coerce defendants into
treatment. Again, maybe this approach is entirely sensible, but it is
still an approach that is fundamentally legislative ....
Providing medical treatment to persons convicted of crimes, or
even to persons in custody awaiting trial, is an executive function,
not a judicial one. By mechanically imposing treatment conditions
on all criminal defendants before they have even entered a plea,
drug courts blur the fundamental distinction between the accused
and the convicted, and therefore between the judicial function of
determining guilt and the executive function of carrying out
sentences and treating prisoners. 136
Critiques like Hoffman's have not been echoed loudly in the
intervening decade, perhaps because drug courts "work" and have been
adopted rapidly across the country, leading to the impression that
therapeutic jurisprudence is operating benignly and beneficently. Still, the
courts are not without their critics. For example, Doug Husak has
demonstrated recently how, from a philosopher's perspective, drug courts
pose a problem to the "principle of parity" and are inconsistent with
retributivist theories of punishment. 137 For the reasons discussed above,
novel medical treatments for addiction may be the wedge to reopen the
debate about the proper social policy and procedures implemented in drug
courts. With opportunities for invasive, long-lasting, and highly-impacting
treatments coming soon from neuroscience, drug courts must revisit the
true roots of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework: a focus on empirically
verifiable results with respect for due process protections for personal
liberty and autonomy. 138
136. Hoffman, supra note 132, at 1526.
137. Husak, supra note 4, at 215.
138. Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, supra note 134, at 447.
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IV. CONCLUSION: PAVING WITH GOOD INTENTIONS DOES NOT PREVENT
A SLIPPERY SLOPE
Unique aspects of how such future drugs and technologies work raise
concerns not fully addressed by merely inserting such technologies into a
therapeutic jurisprudence framework. Some new drugs and techniques
push therapeutic boundaries with respect to invasiveness and irreversibility,
and thus, heighten concerns about protecting an individuals' autonomy and
due process rights when those treatments are offered and delivered via the
coercive powers of the criminal justice system. As long as the criminal
justice system is a primary mode of delivering treatment and rehabilitation
through quasi-judicial institutions such as problem-solving courts, policy
makers and participants must make it a priority to establish clear and
consistent guidelines that protect each individual's constitutional rights.
These rights include the right to refuse medical treatment, retain effective
counsel, not be subject to disproportionate punishment, and make informed
and voluntary decisions about their criminal defense or participation in a
diversion and treatment program. Current problem-solving courts
sometimes soothe such concerns of defense counsel and civil libertarians
with a heaping dose of beneficence and expressed intentions to act in the
client's best interest, but the addition of therapies that are directly invasive
into neural systems should force the issue of how problem-solving courts
can act within a framework that has appropriate protections for
constitutional rights and individual autonomy.
Fundamentally, novel and invasive therapies that complicate the
leveraged treatment delivery picture should reinvigorate a policy debate
about whether or not criminalization of some addictive substances remains
the best policy for effecting the greatest good with the most efficient use of
public resources. A policy of decriminalization may sacrifice some
deterrent effects and some ability to leverage treatment for those who may
need it most, but it may also strike the appropriate balance of state power
against individual autonomy on a public health issue and ultimately save
taxpayer funds. The outcomes, however, depend critically on the safety
and efficacy of novel treatments, which at present remain unknown.
Indeed, such treatments may be a long time coming, which should give
decision makers sufficient time to do some of the difficult policy work
before serious mistakes are made. It is not too soon to critically consider
whether decision-makers should or should not implement all available
technologies and therapies and by which mechanisms of state power.
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